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1 Case Study / Egypt
To what extent was the conflict in 
Egypt generated by lack of inclusion 
of a group or groups in the state’s 
political and legal structures? 
Was there a lack of human rights 
protection for the excluded group? 
Egypt faced a number of challenges in 
the years before mass protests facilitated 
the removal of long-term president, Hosni 
Mubarak, on 11 February 2011. Primarily, 
protester demands took the form of rights-
based grievances, political grievances and 
economic grievances. This was not the first 
time civic action had highlighted these issues. 
Indeed, the growing influence and strategies 
developed over the previous decade by Egypt’s 
labour movements, pro-democracy activists, 
Islamist activists and internet campaigns 
against police brutality were instrumental in 
the mobilisation of protesters (Stein 2012). 
The chosen date of protest in 2011, 
25 January – the national police holiday – 
was indicative of the numerous rights-based 
grievances in Egypt. In particular, the focus 
was on opposition to police brutality and an 
atmosphere of impunity among state security 
facilitated by the 31-year state of emergency 
that allowed for military trials of civilians 
without the possibility of appeal. Another 
facet of rights-based grievances focused 
on the political and social discrimination of 
Egypt’s minority groups. Such groups included 
the ethnic and religious minorities of the 
Nubians, Bedouins and Coptic Orthodox 
Christians (Bakr 2012, 65). However, other 
significant segments of society also faced social, 
economic and political exclusion including the 
youth – 60% of the population was under the 
age of 30 in 2015 (Kingsley 2014) – and women, 
representing 49.4% of the population in 2014 
(Trading Economics 2016).
The largest excluded group consisted of 
Egypt’s lower classes (Bakr 2012). Although 
development indicators in Egypt showed 
improvement since 1990, the population 
boom, increased migration from rural to 
urban regions, and growing unemployment 
placed public facilities under great stress 
(Bakr 2012, 64; El-Mahdi and  Marfleet 2008, 
4–6). Internationally recommended neo-liberal 
reforms rewarded the political and business 
elite first. Moreover, the ruling National 
Democratic Party maintained a strict monopoly 
on political power, as highlighted by the 
constitutional amendments of 2005 and 2007 
(Brown, Dunne and Hamzawy 2007) as well as 
through practices such as ballot stuffing and 
violence against civilians (HRW 2010). These 
circumstances provided a fertile environment 
for the banned Muslim Brotherhood 
organisation, which took responsibility for 
several aspects of local governance including 
the establishment of health, educational, civil 
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and religious organisations, regardless of 
civil society restrictions set by the Ministry 
of Social Solidarity.
 Lastly, displeasure among elites festered as 
the prospect of hereditary rule and a transfer 
of power to Hosni’s son, Gamal Mubarak, 
appeared more likely (El-Mahdi and Marfleet 
2008, 88–89). Military elites also expressed 
dissatisfaction with Egypt’s decreased regional 
influence in the wake of peace with Israel in 1973 
and restrictions set by US military aid, including 
limitations on arms purchases designed to 
ensure that Egypt could not compete with 
Israel militarily (Kandil 2012; 188–189).
How did the reform process try 
to address these grievances?  
Following the 2011 revolution, institutional and 
constitutional reforms attempted to address 
political and human rights-based grievances. 
After the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF), in power for the first 16 months after 
Mubarak, mandated parliamentary elections 
from November 2011 to January 2012, further 
successful elections took place in 2012, 2014 
and 2015. In the first “free and fair” elections 
in Egypt’s history, two-thirds of parliament 
seats went to an Islamist bloc consisting of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice 
Party (FJP) and the Salafist al-Nour Party. 
Meanwhile, the 2012 presidential elections 
on 3 July witnessed the victory of the FJP 
candidate Mohammed Morsi over Mubarak’s 
last Prime Minister and the former General, 
Ahmed Shafiq. Both candidacies were marred 
with contention: Morsi as an Islamist candidate 
from a group the former regime and its 
supporters had repressed on and off since 
the 1950s, and Shafiq as a representative of 
the former regime.
The Islamist victory in the polls was 
indicative of how the balance of power 
had shifted among the Egyptian elite. More 
importantly, it represented an “opening” of the 
Egyptian political system to include formerly 
ostracised groups. Nonetheless, under the 
surface, the individuals and practices of the 
Mubarak era remained influential (Marfleet 
2013). The term, the “deep state” has been used 
to describe the deep-rooted vested interest of 
Mubarak-era officials that dominate the inner-
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circles of the armed forces, the intelligence 
services and the Interior Ministry (Childress 
2013). As such, comprehensive institutional 
reform was difficult to accomplish. Within 
six months, the Supreme Court, consisting of 
Mubarak-era judges, dissolved the Parliament 
in what the Islamist bloc considered a “coup” 
(Hearst and Hussein 2012). Nonetheless, 
in a controversial step, within weeks of his 
electoral victory, Morsi reinstated Parliament 
until new elections were announced. 
Furthermore, Morsi was quick to rescind the 
SCAF’s constitutional declaration issued a 
few days before he became President, which 
aimed at limiting his executive power. In August, 
Morsi also reshuffled a number of high-level 
positions in the military and dismissed the SCAF 
leader, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, in what 
appeared to be an attempt to regain the loyalty 
of the military.
The tug-of-war between state institutions 
and elected officials was extended to the 
constitutional drafting process, which became 
a mainstay of political controversy from 
2011 to 2014. This period saw the creation of 
three Constitutional Assemblies (CAs), two 
referendums on two constitutions held on 
26 December 2012 and 18 January 2014, as well 
as four constitutional declarations issued by 
the SCAF (3) and Morsi (1) on 30 March 2011, 
17 June 2012, 22 November 2012 and 8 July 
2013. However, continued political turmoil 
surrounding institutional and constitutional 
reform failed to improve the Egyptian economy. 
A major factor in the instigation of the 2011 
revolution, economic stagnation was mobilised 
alongside accusations of exclusionary practices 
by the Islamist bloc, to become the primary 
justification used by the Tamarod campaign, 
which led to the mass protests of June and 
July 2013 and the intervention by the armed 
forces on 3 July.
How did inclusion and protection 
of rights feature in the constitutional 
reform approach?
The ratification of the 2012 Constitution took 
place despite its “ambiguous language on 
human rights, minority rights and freedom 
of expression” as well as allowing civilian 
trials by military courts (Hussein 2012). 
Some of these issues were resolved in the 
2014 Constitution. Among them, the 2014 
Constitution granted ethnic minorities 
assurances of non-discrimination (Article 53) 
and guarantees of economic development to 
underprivileged areas (Article 236). Article 236 
(2014) also granted Nubians repatriation to the 
former territories they were displaced from 
by the building of the Aswan Dam. In another 
victory for cultural minorities, the 2014 
Constitution also emphasised cultural rights 
(Articles 47–50).
Vague terminology, however, hampered 
efforts to ensure rights for other vulnerable 
groups. “Appropriate representation” 
was granted to workers, farmers, women, © 
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youth, Christians and expatriate Egyptians 
in Articles 223 and 224 (2014), but there was 
no further clarification of what was deemed 
to be “appropriate”. Clauses restricting 
women’s rights in the 2012 Constitution were 
removed and Article 11 (2014) stipulated that 
women were equal to men in all “civic, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights” (Serodio 
and Hulsman 2015, 49–50).” Freedom of belief 
was also guaranteed, but state protection 
was only granted for the Abrahamic religions 
(Article 64, 2012, 2014). However, constitutional 
restrictions on freedom of expression via 
Article 44 (2012) were removed from the 2014 
Constitution, although it remained part of the 
Penal Code (Serodio and Hulsman 2015, 67).
In regard to military trials, Article 198 of 
the 2012 Constitution had ambiguous phrasing 
that could have referred civilians to the military 
judiciary, but was later redrafted. Nonetheless, 
it remained unclear in the 2014 Constitution 
how Articles 173 and 204 limited civilian trials 
by the military judiciary (Serodio and Hulsman 
2015, 117–119). Moreover, the military remained 
impervious to civilian oversight.
How did the peace or reform process 
approach inclusivity: did it focus just 
on the dominant groups at the heart 
of the conflict? To to what extent 
did it also attempt broader inclusion 
of other groups and interests?
The first protests on 25 January 2011 
were primarily mobilised by educated and 
unemployed youths and political activists, 
who were accompanied by broader societal 
groups as protests continued unabated. 
However, as soon as Mubarak stepped down, 
more established political entities sidelined 
the youth and lower classes. Some youth 
groups such as the Maspero Youth Union and 
April 6 Youth Movement continued to hold 
some political sway via street mobilisation. 
However, by spring 2013, Morsi’s government 
put in place new laws in order to curtail the 
continuous stream of protests. These laws, 
alongside strict regulations on civil society 
organisations, constrained the ability of 
youth groups to organise.
Aside from organisations within the state 
apparatus, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
undoubtedly best suited to take advantage of 
the political opening. Using its charitable and 
religious networks set up over decades, the 
Brotherhood leveraged the electoral power 
needed to ensure dominance in both the 
parliamentary and the presidential elections 
of 2012. The first constitutional initiative 
was a product of the initial inclusivity of the 
Egyptian system, which allowed formerly 
banned groups access to state institutions via 
democratic means. The apprehension towards 
the Brotherhood held by political and ruling 
elites and the security forces was not shared 
by Egypt’s lower and middle classes for whom 
religion is a major facet of personal and 
collective identity. Thus, for many of Egypt’s 
Sunni Muslims, the FJP and Morsi represented 
a pious change from the corrupt regime of 
Mubarak – represented by Shafiq’s candidacy. 
However, once in power, the Islamist bloc 
was reluctant to share the democratic spoils 
with their political rivals. As a result, justified 
by the electoral legitimacy, inclusion was not 
a priority as much as wrestling power from 
the former regime.
This was particularly apparent in the 
constitutional drafting process of 2012. The 
first CA that gathered on 26 March 2012 
contained a two-third Islamist bloc with 
only 6% women and 5% Coptic Christians. 
Deemed unrepresentative, the Assembly 
was dissolved less than a month later by the 
Cairo Administrative Court on the grounds 
that it violated Article 60 of the SCAF’s 
declaration of March 2011 (ICJ 2012, 14). The 
second CA of 2012 was more diverse due to an 
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unlimited cap on civil society representatives 
and the appointment of its members by 
the Parliament rather than the reliance on 
electoral percentages. Nonetheless, at 55%, 
the Islamist bloc maintained a numerical 
majority. On 14 June 2012, when the Supreme 
Court dissolved the Parliament, the legality 
of the second CA was also challenged (since 
the Parliament chose the CA) (ICJ 2012, 15), 
but the Assembly remained following Morsi’s 
decree on 8 July. As the drafting process 
continued, tensions increased dramatically: 
street battles broke out between pro- and 
anti-Morsi protesters, and the police. Towards 
the end of the drafting process, as secular 
and leftist members of the CA walked out in 
protest of Islamist dominance, Morsi issued 
a constitutional declaration on 22 November 
blocking any dissolution of the Assembly by the 
judiciary. Lawsuits and the protest resignations 
of Morsi’s advisors, Samir Marcos (the only 
Christian) and Sekina Fouad (a woman), did not 
deter the declaration’s durability. Nonetheless, 
the November 2012 declaration became a 
key point of reference for the subsequent 
demonisation of the FJP regime, with narratives 
surfacing that emphasised how Morsi worked 
for the Muslim Brotherhood rather than the 
Egyptian people as a whole. 
After Morsi’s deposal on 3 July 2013, the 
immediate goal was political stability. The 
second constitutional initiative was thus 
instigated as a means to show the inclusiveness 
of the incoming regime of President Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi as well as symbolically wash 
the country’s hands of Morsi’s legacy. Pro-
Morsi supporters, as well as other liberal and 
leftist anti-coup organisations that opposed 
the military’s interference in the democratic 
process, were forcibly scattered, deprived of 
the ability to voice their discontent and subject 
to immense repression by the new regime. By 
the end of 2013, the Brotherhood was labelled 
a terrorist organisation first by the media and 
then the judiciary, and forced underground.
Pro-Morsi supporters that remained 
politically active denounced the new 2013 
constitutional process and boycotted it. 
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Indeed, in the third CA, only one member was 
rumoured to have ties with the Brotherhood 
and the only Salafist member was Mohammed 
Ibrahim. The structure of the third CA was 
reformed to include the Committee of Ten: an 
expert body that would propose amendments 
and serve in a consultative role to the 
Committee of Fifty. The Committee of Fifty, 
on the other hand, consisted of appointed 
members from public and private organisations, 
institutions and syndicates, including political 
parties, the police, the military, the church and 
al-Azhar (Serodio and Hulsman 2015, 26). The 
Committee of Fifty also included 10% women, 
10% youth and 8% Christians. Thus, on paper 
the 2013 CA seemed more representative, 
but the absence of Egypt’s significant Islamist 
current marred its inclusivity.
What were the critical moments 
when attempts at inclusion could 
have succeeded (and did not) or 
failed (and did not)? What factors 
– in country leadership, civil society 
mobilisation and international 
intervention – determined whether 
they succeeded or failed?
Critical moments during Egypt’s post-2011 
era were most evident in the widely broadcast 
incidents when segments of society would 
victimise the “other” in the name of either 
religion or nationalism for political gain. This 
scapegoating trend occurred on several 
occasions during the rise and political 
dominance of the Islamist bloc and then 
continued against the Muslim Brotherhood in 
the subsequent backlash after Morsi’s deposal. 
Sectarian events (for example, the Maspero 
Massacre of October 2012 or the April 2013 
attack on St. Mark’s Cathedral, the Seat of the 
Coptic Pope in Cairo) occurred more often 
after the 2011 revolution. Such events were also 
indicative of the dramatic decline in rule of law 
in Egypt, as well as a lack of professionalism 
among segments of Egypt’s media outlets and 
state security, the latter of which participated 
in the above-mentioned incidents.
In part, such incidents were spurred by 
the lack of a consensus candidate who could 
represent Egyptian unity – a role that al-Sisi 
attempted to fulfil in his role as “national 
saviour”. Increasing sectarianism was also 
a by-product of the politicisation of Egypt’s 
main religious institutions, the Coptic Orthodox 
Church and the al-Azhar – a thousand-year 
bastion of Islamic jurisprudence. However, 
despite claims refuting any role in politics, both 
Pope Tawadros and the Azhar Grand Imam 
Ahmed al-Tayeb became political figures after 
the 2011 revolution, which in turn made them 
polarising figures. Due to the Copts’ reliance 
on the protection of the state in an increasingly 
Islamicised environment, Pope Tawadros 
avoided direct criticism of state security and 
the military despite their involvement in the 
attacks on Copts at Maspero and St. Marks. 
Due to Tawadros’ lack of criticism, hardline 
Islamists branded the Copts “supporters of the 
old regime” and “anti-revolutionary” and used 
sectarian rhetoric to justify political violence 
against them (Forster 2013). Meanwhile, the 
al-Azhar leadership held ideological differences 
to the Brotherhood in regards to Salafism, 
which had itself become a dominant trend in 
the Brotherhood (Nasira 2010; Noueihed 2014). 
Moreover, the disconnect between the al-Azhar 
leadership and the significant portion of 
Brotherhood-supporting students grew wider 
following the rhetoric of some senior Azhari 
officials justifying the crackdown on pro-Morsi 
protesters in Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda 
(Gomaa 2013). Thus, religion became conflated 
with state propaganda, thereby discrediting the 
religious institutions among their constituents 
and their opponents and diminishing the ability 
of religious leaders to intervene positively 
despite their best attempts. 
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How transformative has the process 
been on the inclusion front? If not 
transformative now, were there 
transformative moments, or is there 
further transformative potential?
Initially, the “opening” of the Egyptian 
political system through electoral politics 
granted formerly excluded groups access. 
However, optimism eroded as identity 
politics emerged as a key mobilising factor 
and economic stability failed to materialise. 
Displeased with Islamist dominance in the 
legislature, the Presidential Office, and the 
2012 CAs – the political, business and military 
elites who rose to their prominent positions 
during the Mubarak era – mobilised their 
resources within and beyond the state to 
form a counter-narrative aiming to discredit 
the Islamist bloc through the use of, among 
other things, talk shows and print media. 
Exclusive practices by the Islamist bloc, 
including the “forced” ratification of the 
2012 constitution, the deteriorating state 
of the Egyptian economy, and narratives 
highlighting the fanaticism of Morsi’s 
supporters (Andersen 2014), became part 
of the justification used by the activist group 
Tamarod – supported by intelligence and the 
armed forces (Frenkel and Atef 2014) – for its 
campaign against Morsi in the spring of 2013. 
The mass protests from 29 June to 3 July 2013 
arose because Tamarod’s agitation provided the 
armed forces with the necessary momentum to 
step in and remove President Morsi.
In its aftermath, the Rabaa al-Adawiya 
massacre was only the public façade of 
a comprehensive crackdown on the Muslim 
Brotherhood, with almost 60,000 arrested 
between July 2013 and 2016 and others either 
in exile or disappeared (El-Ansary 2016). The 
gradual political reforms from 2005 onwards, 
that saw members of the Brotherhood in 
Parliament (though banned at the time) 
were stripped away entirely. Moreover, liberal, 
secular and leftist groups have since been 
subject to mass repression, with the state 
broadening its targets to include anyone 
openly vocal of their disapproval of the state 
or the President. Lists of offending individuals, 
including media personalities and politicians – 
the so-called “fifth column blacklist” – has since 
been made public by the state-owned al-Ahram 
media outlet (al-Ahram al-Arabi 2013).
Nonetheless, some cosmetic changes did 
occur. In the 2015 Parliament, women made-
up 14.9% of parliamentary seats, up from 
1.8% in 2012 and 12% in 2010 (Diaa 2016). 
Representatives under the age of 35, on the 
other hand, won 13.4% of seats – double their 
quota (Wardani 2015). However, the legitimacy 
of this accomplishment is questionable 
considering steady decline in voter turnout 
from 54% in the second round of the 2011/2012 
parliamentary elections, to 10% in the 2015 
elections, illustrating popular disillusionment 
with the reform process.
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